of the Hague Convention (TV) of 1907 and the Nuremberg Charter, practically all of the conventional and charter-based sources of international criminal law and international humanitarian law, which substantially, if not entirely, overlap with the subject matter of the Draft Code, have emerged since 1947, in particular the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 thereto, as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. This posed a fundamental problem for the drafters of the Code. If the Code departed from the texts of these instruments, then it might create contradictions in the law and sow the seeds of confusion. But if it merely reproduced those texts verbatim, then it would be otiose. How men was the Draft Code to coexist alongside these instruments and what use was it to make of them?
The approach taken by the ILC has been to transplant the operative elements of various conventions and instruments, while modifying those provisions where it sees fit. In particular, additional elements have been added to what are already international crimes in order to elevate them to the status of the more serious crimes against the peace and security of mankind. This issue will be taken up in the next section. Unfortunately, however, this activity has not been carried out consistently and it has not had the virtue of rationalizing or simplifying the existing law. Rather, the reverse has occurred, as this article will attempt to demonstrate. It will be submitted that if the Code does not rationalize the existing law into a more coherent corpus, departing from the texts of international instruments only when they are seen to contain imperfections or where the law has since developed, then it will be simpler for national courts or the permanent criminal court to have recourse to those existing instruments and to customary law rather than to the Code. Thus, if its present deficiencies are not redressed, the sad conclusion may be drawn that it is better for the administration of international criminal law if the Code is simply not adopted at all.
II. Commentary

A. Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind versus Other Crimes under General International Law
It is fundamental to an analysis of the ILC's modus operandi to understand that a distinction is implicitly drawn in the Draft Code between crimes against the peace and security of mankind, 4 on the one hand, and other crimes under general intema- tional law such as genocide, war crimes, and so forth, on the other. In some cases, the ILC seems to consider that a crime such as genocide is also a crime against the peace and security of mankind. In other cases, additional criteria are introduced to elevate crimes under general international law to the status of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. For example, under the Draft Code, only war crimes which are large-scale or systematic are considered to constitute crimes against the peace and security of mankind:
These general criteria for war crimes under the Code are based on the view that crimes against the peace and security of mankind are the most serious on the scale of international offences and that, in order for an offence to be regarded as a crime against the peace and security of mankind, it must meet certain additional criteria which raise its level of seriousness.
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The rationale behind the additional criteria chosen is that only those crimes under general international law which meet the additional criteria are so serious as to threaten the peace and security of mankind. In this way, the ILC uses this distinction to modify definitions of certain crimes, adding additional criteria, without, however, any authority for so doing. The authority is quite simply absent because there is no normative source for crimes against the peace and security of mankind or for meir criteria of identity. The Draft Code itself is the only source of law for these crimes defined as crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Hence, the ILC's work in this area is inevitably pure innovation.
The problem with this is that the pre-eminent authority for making determinations as to whether an event of any description constitutes a threat to the peace and security of mankind lies with the Security Council of the United Nations. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'. 6 To adopt an approach whereby every offence is premised on a threat to peace and security, as opposed to an approach which simply treats the title 'code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind' as a general chapeau for all crimes under international law, runs certain risks. First, it would mean that a prosecution under the Draft Code could always be challenged by the defence whenever the Security Council has not antecedently determined that the facts in question constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
Mens Rea
Article 2 The Draft Code thus purports to establish intention as the requisite mens rea for crimes against the peace and security of mankind other than aggression, leaving aside for the moment inchoate forms of liability discussed below. Having done this, however, it proceeds in its substantive provisions to enumerate many other forms of mens rea which belie the simple statement in Article 2(3Xa): 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such' ( 
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It is clear in most of these cases why these formulae are used. For example, it would be impossible to imagine the crime of genocide being defined without the formula, 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or re- In some instances, moreover, it is not just a question of duplication; the mens rea requirements are actually in contradiction. See, for example, Article 20(eXii) -'wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity'. 'Wantonly' is closer in meaning to 'recklessly' than to 'intentionally', and is, in fact, a lower threshold. An army commander may destroy a church by taking a high and, let us assume, unjustifiable risk that the church will be destroyed by his shelling, without, however, intending to destroy it (i.e. wanton destruction). Alternatively, he may destroy the church because that is his aim (i.e. intentional destruction). Both types of destruction should fall under the Code -wanton destruction because it is expressly provided for in Article 20(eXii) and intentional destruction because it is a fortiori. However Article 2(3Xa), which stipulates a general requirement of intentional behaviour, sheds doubt on whether there is indeed liability for wanton destruction. 
Actus Reus
The ILC's approach of 'cutting and pasting' norms, to use computer jargon, is illustrated by the way in which it has tinkered with the actus reus of various international crimes. When so doing, it often uses non-legal language in preference to tried-andtested formulae. There are good reasons, however, for retaining legal terminology which over time has acquired a precise meaning in preference to everyday words which may have a number of meanings. An example is provided by Article 2(3)(b), which uses the phrase, ' ... orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs ...'. This wording fails to capture the intended idea that there must be a causal link between the order and the crime which is committed. Another example appears in Article 18(f). with the expression, 'institutionalised discrimination ... resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population'. other punishable acts enumerated in Article 3 of that Convention, which cast a larger net than simply condemning the crime of genocide per se. Article 3 of the Genocide Convention states that not only should genocide be considered as an act which is punishable under the Convention, but that 'conspiracy to commit genocide', 'direct and public incitement to commit genocide', 'attempt to commit genocide', and 'complicity in genocide' should also be punishable. Furthermore, Article 6 of the Genocide Convention calls on the contracting parties to try those charged with the acts enumerated in Article 3 before a municipal tribunal where the crimes occurred or 'such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction'. Given the provisions of the Genocide Convention, it is scarcely conceivable that an international criminal code could include the crime of genocide and yet not provide explicitly for jurisdiction over incitement to commit, complicity in, or attempted genocide. This oversight is compounded by events of the recent past.
The case of Rwanda has demonstrated that genocide takes many faces and that incitement may very well be the most odious of crimes, even if the offence incited does not take place at all or on the scale incited (see below). It is also noteworthy that the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR have provisions which correspond exactly to Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention.
25 Furthermore, the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) states that these provisions are 'crimes under international law for which individuals shall be tried and punished' and that the Genocide Convention 'is considered part of international customary law'.
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Against this it may be countered that Article 2(3) of the Draft Code, which deals inter alia with inchoate forms of liability, 27 would cover the 'other punishable acts' in Article 3 of the Genocide Convention. This is only partly true, however. Although there is a rough correspondence between the 'other punishable acts' under the Genocide Convention and the inchoate forms of liability enumerated in the Draft Code, there are also significant discrepancies, as the following chart demonstrates (discrepancies are marked in italics).
It can be seen from this chart that the neat formulae of the Genocide Convention have only approximate counterparts in the Draft Code. Moreover, additional requirements for liability, which do not appear in the Genocide Convention, are stipulated in the Draft Code. Most notably, with the exception of attempt to commit genocide, the Draft Code requires that the complete offence, i.e. genocide, actually be committed in each case. Hence, we find die recurrent phrase, 'which in fact occurs*. But this is a significant and, it is submitted, unwarranted addition. Under the Genocide Convention, simple agreement with another to commit genocide might be sufficient to constitute a punishable act, irrespective of whether the agreement is The torn, 'inchoate offences' refers to offences which may be committed notwithstanding that the substantive offence to which they relate -'the complete offence' -has not been committed (i.e. attempts, conspiracies and incitements). ever put into effect Likewise with incitement, if a person addresses a crowd and implores its members to commit genocide, then he should be liable to punishment, as suggested above, irrespective of whether the genocide is in fact carried out.
If the Draft Code had incorporated the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention in toto, then there would be clear liability for attempt, incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide, as well as for complicity. Instead, there are only partially equivalent formulations, which, moreover, raise the threshold for liability. This would be justified if the ILC could demonstrate that international law has developed in this direction. But no such development is argued for. In fact, quite the opposite is indicated by the proviso that it 'does not in any way affect the application of the general principles independently of the Code [sic] or of similar provisions contained in other instruments, notably article in of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'.
29
In fact, there have been developments of the law relating to genocide, provided by the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which the ILC could take into account For exam-
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Since the notion of aiding and abetting is synonymous with being an accomplice, the difference in wording is not considered here to be a discrepancy. Hence, it is not italicized. Just as identifying 'racism' does not imply that there are races, a charge of genocide need not imply that human society is in fact composed of discrete ethnic, national or religious groups. It is submitted that the ELC would do well to adopt this progressive approach.
Article 18 -Crimes against Humanity
Article 18 enumerates eleven offences which are to be considered crimes against humanity if they are committed in a 'systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organisation or group'. These offences arc murder, extermination, torture, enslavement, persecution, discrimination which violates fundamental human rights, arbitrary deportation, arbitrary imprisonment, forced disappearance, rape, and other inhumane acts.
Among its other features, it is worth remarking that Article 18 does not include as a requirement of crimes against humanity that the prohibited acts be committed against a civilian population. This is striking inasmuch as Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, which provided the chief inspiration for the Rapporteur's draft, 3I on crimes against humanity, referred to 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population ...\ 32 Likewise, the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR provide for jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only when the crimes are directed 'against any civilian population'. Lacunae such as these may be left to judicial interpretation. This, however, raises a general issue. Where should the balance be struck between a Code which is so comprehensive as to leave no room for development through case law and a Code which does leave certain issues to be developed by judges applying the Code? The civil law tradition favours a precise and comprehensive code. Yet in common law, there may not be a criminal code at all, or, if there is one, resort to it may nonetheless require consulting case law which has given a more exact meaning to the text of the code. The ILC might consider to what extent it would envisage the Draft Code being moulded over time by judicial interpretation.
The sub-paragraph in Article 18 on 'institutionalised discrimination' is meant to cover apartheid. 35 The additional requirement, however, that such discrimination must not only involve the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms but must also result in 'seriously disadvantaging a part of the population', seems too restrictive. The policy of segregation which operated in the southern states of the USA before the civil rights era was described as being 'separate but equal'. Should it not be sufficient for an apartheid-type crime that there be discrimination on racial, etc. grounds, without requiring proof of the further elements added by the 19% 
Article 19-Crimes against United Nations and Associated Personnel
In general, this article is somewhat objectionable insofar as it treats United Nations personnel as a select class, and thus the ILC appears, in effect, to be protecting its own. This is particularly so, since the 1996 Draft Code has substantially reduced the list of crimes enumerated in the 1991 draft. 36 To so substantially reduce the scope of the Code, removing Threat of aggression', 'Intervention', 'Colonial domination and other forms of alien domination', 'Apartheid', 'Recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries', 'international terrorism' and 'illicit traffic in narcotic drugs', while retaining 'Crimes against United Nations personnel', which for all its importance does not appear worthy to rank alongside 'aggression', 'crimes against humanity', 'genocide' and 'war crimes', is regrettable.
It is certainly true, however, that the prohibition contained in Article 19 might have been useful in previous United Nations 'peace-keeping' missions. However, paragraph 2 of Article 19 provides that:
This article shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorised by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organised armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.
In practice, it may be very difficult to say when United Nations forces are to be considered combatants, and when not, A Chapter VII mandate does not necessarily imply that the forces deployed under that mandate are combatants. They may, for example, be 'peace-keepers'.
This crime under Article 19 also requires a somewhat special mens rea in that the perpetrator must commit his crimes 'with a view to preventing or impeding that operation from fulfilling its mandate'. Does this mean that the perpetrator must know what the United Nations mandate is? Given that even United Nations personnel may on occasion be in doubt as to their own mandate -witness the confusion in Somalia and the bitter arguments over die precise mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina of UNPROFOR -and the considerable room for interpretation of a United Nations mandate, this would be an extremely difficult element to prove. It is also strange that the article requires that the crimes be committed 'in a systematic manner or on a large scale'. Surely an isolated act of hostage-taking of UN personnel would be a crime against United Nations personnel? In fact, by referring to acts committed 'in armed conflict not of an international character', and thus insisting on a dichotomy which did not appear in the 1991 Draft Code, the 1996 Draft Code takes a very large step back indeed. International humanitarian law is fast moving in the direction of obliterating this distinction altogether. The ICTY has had much to say on this subject In the Tadic interlocutory appeal decision of 2 October 1996, which has come to be regarded as a landmark in this area of law, the Appeals Chamber declared:
97.
Since the 1930s ... the aforementioned distinction [between the law applicable to international armed conflict and that applicable to internal armed conflict] has gradually become more and more blurred, and international legal rules have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to regulate internal armed conflict... It follows that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign states are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the some protection when armed violence has erupted 'only' within the territory of a sovereign state?
The Appeals Chamber thus suggests recourse to the concept of 'serious violations of international humanitarian law', which can be applied to a core of crimes irrespective of the nature of the conflict Judge Abi-Saab in a separate opinion to the above decision reached the same result by a different route, by arguing that the 'grave breaches' regime of the Geneva Conventions can apply equally to internal or international armed conflict: Some of the details [of this Convention] may seem superfluous; repetition and lack of harmony between certain provisions may also cause surprise. It should, how-ever, be remembered that, whilst throughout concerned with the Convention as an instrument in International Law, the [Diplomatic] Conference had constantly in mind a special use to which it was to be put -regulations to be posted in prisoner of war camps and comprehensible not only to the authorities, but to the ordinary reader. Furthermore, the Conference did not hesitate to sacrifice neatness in the interest of unanimous agreement. These are reasons, which with the difficulty of establishing official legal texts simultaneously in two languages, may account for, and even justify, most of the textual imperfections to be found in the Prisoners of War Conventions. 59 Thus, it is submitted, what is needed is an approach much more along the lines of the 1991 Draft Code's Article 22, 'Exceptionally serious war crimes', which distils from the Conventions, as they have developed in practice and in the jurisprudence, a core of acts which are criminal irrespective of the nature of the conflict in which they occur.
m. Conclusion
Although the 1991 Draft Code, which was the culmination of nearly a half century of work, was considered, by the consensus of most international criminal law experts, insufficient as it stood, 40 the ILC's newly adopted 1996 Draft Code rejects all past work and appears to have lost its way in attempting to forge new ground. As a result, the ELC may well have caused the totality of its work in this area to be for nought With the adoption of a Statute of a Permanent Criminal Court looming nearer, and the ELC having only its 1996 Draft Code to show for nearly fifty of work, it may be that the ELC has now ensured that a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind will never come into being. 
